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Terrorism threats and temporary exclusion orders: counter-
terror rhetoric or reality?     
 
Helen Fenwick* 
Abstract 
 
Key words: temporary exclusion orders, ISIS, counter-terrorism, ECHR, control orders  
 
Western democracies are currently facing a terrorist threat which comes mainly from their 
own Salafist-jihadi supporting citizens. In evaluating the threat there is at present a particular 
focus on nationals who have travelled abroad to support ISIS, or similar groups, and may 
return (often referred to as “foreign terrorist fighters”), especially given that ISIS-held 
territory is likely to continue to shrink in 2017 and beyond. Exploration of measures to 
combat this threat is ongoing in a number of democracies, and in the UK led to the 
introduction in 2015 of temporary exclusion orders (TEOs), under the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015. The thinking behind TEOs bears some conceptual resemblance to that 
behind measures introduced in the UK and other democracies to strip dual national suspects 
of citizenship, and even - in terms of seeking to place TEO-subjects outside the UK’s ECHR 
jurisdictional responsibility - to that underlying creation of CIA “dark sites”. The orders 
represent the latest manifestation of liberty-invading non-trial-based executive measures 
introduced post-9/11 in the UK; therefore, as would be expected, they are in tension with 
domestic and international human rights law. This article will argue that the basis put to 
Parliament by the government for creating a reconciliation between such law and reliance on 
the orders is flawed, which may partly explain the marked reluctance to deploy them in 
practice, even in the face of the currently increased threat from returnee foreign terrorist 
fighters. It will therefore consider the relevance, if any, of TEOs to that threat and their role 
in the global struggle against terrorism. It will question why, against the backdrop of the 
current, increasing ISIS-linked threat, the UK has saddled itself with another counterterrorism 
power that appears to sit on the books and perform no clear role, another power owing more 
to counter-terror rhetoric than to enhancing security. 
 
Introduction  
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     The post-9/11 years have seen a struggle in the UK and elsewhere to reconcile human 
rights norms with reliance on non-trial-based counter-terror measures,
1
 a struggle that is 
exacerbated since the terrorism threat currently faced by Western democracies comes mainly 
from their own citizens
2
 who cannot be deported, if mono-nationals. That has led, as will be 
discussed, to a global proliferation of citizenship-deprivation measures. In the years 2014-17 
the threat has been found to come in part from nationals who have travelled abroad to fight or 
train with ISIS, or similar groups, and then seek to return,
3
 a threat that may increase as ISIS-
held territory continues to diminish in 2017 and beyond. The threat from British returnees as 
one group of “foreign terrorist fighters” (FTFs), while far from the only form of terrorism 
threatening the UK,
4
 was credited with triggering the introduction of a new non-trial-based 
measure in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) Part 1 Chapter 2 – 
temporary exclusion orders (TEOs). TEOs borrow a number of features from control orders 
and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs)
5
 as non-trial-based executive 
measures. They are imposed by the Home Secretary, with subsequent court review, on a low 
standard of proof, and enable individuals to be subjected to significant restrictions on liberty. 
                                                          
*Professor of Law, Law School, University of Durham. My thanks are due to David Anderson QC for 
comments on an early draft of this article given as a paper. 
1
 See Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 2
nd
 edn (eds V Ramraj, M Hor, K Roach, G Williams) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chaps 6,9,18,20,21. 
2
 See: H Summers “UK faces terror threat from Isis 'not seen since IRA bombings'” The Guardian, 26.2.17: 
Max Hill QC, the new Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, “expressed fears about the imminent 
return of hundreds of British jihadis who have been fighting for Isis in Syria” (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/feb/26/isis-uk-faces-terror-threat-not-seen-since-ira-bombings [last accessed 20.4.17]). E MacAskill 
and P Johnson “There will be terrorist attacks in Britain” The Guardian 1.11.16, interview with Andrew Parker, 
current Head of MI5: “there are about 3,000 “violent Islamic extremists in the UK, mostly British” 
(https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/01/andrew-parker-mi5-director-general-there-will-be-
terrorist-attacks-in-britain-exclusive [last accessed 20.4.17]). The attacks in January 2015 on Charlie Hebdo, at 
a kosher supermarket, and the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015 were organised and perpetrated largely 
by ISIS-supporters, some of whom had fought with ISIS, and almost all of whom were French nationals: see B 
Farmer,  “What we know about the suspects” The Telegraph 18 March 2016. The Brussels terrorist strike on 
22.3.16, the deadliest act of terrorism in Belgium's history, was perpetrated by at least 3 Belgian nationals: see 
BBC News 9.4.16: “Brussels explosions: What we know about airport and metro attacks”. The Normandy 
church attack, 26.7.16, was perpetrated by French citizens, the Nice truck attack by Lahouaiej-Bouhlel on 
14.7.16, who had a French residency permit, the Westminster attack by Khalid Masood, a British citizen, on 
22.3.17, also used a vehicle against pedestrians. Far-right extremists presenting a threat also tend to be ‘home-
grown: see “Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series, a joint report by experts”, the Royal United Services 
Institute, Chatham House, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and the University of Leiden (2015).   
3
 Max Hill, 2017, ibid; see also note 25. 
4 See: the references to Northern Irish and extreme right wing terrorism in “The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Report 
of the Independent Reviewer” September 2015, especially paras 2.17 and 2.19; Charles Anthony “There are far-
right wannabe terrorists in the UK”, The Independent 24.11.16. But the threat appears not to be as great as that 
from Islamic groups: David Anderson QC, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, “The 
Terrorism Acts in 2015”, December 2016, paras 2.24, 2.25. 
5
 Under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, as amended by CTSA 2015 Part 2. 
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But while, as explored below, TEOs are more likely to create tensions with human rights 
norms than TPIMs, they have been presented as reconcilable with such norms, not centrally 
through recalibrations of human rights as was necessitated by control orders,
6
 or by means of 
a derogation,
7
 but on the basis that excluding TEO subjects from the UK places them, for a 
period, outside the UK’s European Convention on Human Rights or ICCPR jurisdictional 
competence.  
 
     The thinking behind TEOs bears some conceptual resemblance to that behind measures 
introduced in the UK and other democracies to strip nationals of citizenship, and even - in 
terms of seeking to place TEO-subjects outside the UK’s ECHR jurisdictional responsibility - 
to that underlying creation of CIA “dark sites”. (The US government took the stance that the 
usual human rights’ constraints did not apply to such sites since they were off-shore; in 
somewhat similar vein, the UK government considers that such constraints, in the form of 
obligations of the UK, are inapplicable, since TEO-subjects are for a time outside UK 
territory.) But unlike the reliance on such measures to counter terrorism, TEOs have not yet 
been deployed, despite their apparent connection with averting a current threat from ISIS-
supporting returnees. So it will be argued that, despite the UK’s stance as to jurisdictional 
competence, the ECHR via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) may have created a stronger 
inhibitory impact on their use than it already had done on control orders, and then on TPIMs.
8
 
This article will therefore contend that concern as to their possible ECHR and ICCPR 
implications, combined with the practical problems of utilising them,
9
 means that 
introduction of TEOs as new executive liberty-invading measures appears to owe more to 
counter-terror rhetoric than to an expectation that they will be of practical utility. It therefore 
considers their role in the global struggle against terrorism, and asks why, in the face of the 
                                                          
6 The early ‘heavy touch’ control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (see Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642) appeared to demand a minimising reinterpretation of certain 
rights, in particular Article 5, in effect emptying the right of part of its content or implying new exceptions into 
it. In 2009 a Report on global terrorism of the International Commission of Jurists Report of the Eminent Jurists 
Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, Assessing Damage, Urging Action (Geneva, ICJ, 
2009) identified this trend in the UK and other countries in the face of terrorism. See further Helen Fenwick, 
“Recalibrating ECHR rights, and the role of the Human Rights Act post-9/11: reasserting international human 
rights norms in the ‘war on terror’?” (2011) 63 Current Legal Problems 153. 
7
 In a well-known episode, reliance on indefinite detention without trial for non-citizens (under the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Part 4) and human rights law was sought via use of a derogation under 
Article 15, from the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR. That reconciliation failed when the derogation order 
was struck down by the House of Lords: A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Dept (2004) UKHL 56. 
8
 See below note 191. 
9
 Since identifying and intercepting a suspect seeking to return is likely to prove problematic due to the various 
routes to return that could be used. 
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current and possibly increasing threat posed by FTFs, the UK has ended up with another 
counterterrorism power that appears merely to sit on the books, another counterterrorism 
power owing more to ‘security theatre’ than to enhancing security.10  
 
The threat from FTFs and the desirability of excluding terrorist suspects 
from their home state  
 
The threat posed by ISIS-supporters 
 
     The justification for introducing TEOs rests in part on the threat currently posed to Europe 
and globally by ISIS and its supporters, which appears to be of a greater order of magnitude 
than the one posed by Al-Qaeda and linked groups, although persons returning from, for 
example, Pakistan who may have trained there with such groups may also present a threat 
(and would also be covered by the TEO scheme).
11
 The fact that at present ISIS still controls 
territory means that it provides physical bases that those in the UK and elsewhere attracted by 
its Salafist-jihadi ideology can travel to,
12
 although the numbers travelling diminished in 
2015-17;
13
 it can provide bases for weapons training, for inducting children into its violent 
ideology, and for sending out trained persons to mount attacks in Europe and globally.
14
  
 
                                                          
10
 Any rhetorical function of TEOs recalls Bruce Schneier’s idea that some counter-terror measures may make 
people feel more secure without having any real function in increasing security; see “Beyond Security Theater” 
New Internationalist November 2009. See note 193 and associated text for further examples of such measures. 
11
 Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, Session 08-09, 
21.7.09 (S Langan, answer to Q41) was to the effect that Pakistan militant groups, which “were initially 
configured to fight in that region, have signed up to the global jihad”. For example, Lashkar-e-Taiba, held 
largely responsible for the Mumbai attacks, was found to have tapped into the logistical ability and capability of 
al-Qaeda. 
12
 Estimates for the total number of foreign fighters with Sunni terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria are around 
15,000 from 80 countries – 3,000 to 5,000 with Jabhat al-Nusra and 7,000 to 10,000 with ISIS/ISIL; 3,850 
fighters are estimated to be from Europe: figures from “At high-level debate, UN, Security Council renew 
pledge to counter foreign terrorist fighters”, UN press release, 19.11.14, quoted in “Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Bill” No 127 of 2014-15 Research Paper 14/63 27.11.14. David Anderson found in December 2016: 
“The Paris attacks of November 2015 and the Brussels bombings of March 2016 demonstrate that former Daesh 
fighters have formed organised cells, infiltrated Europe and have the capacity – even as Daesh loses territory in 
its Iraqi and Syrian heartlands – to wreak havoc and destruction [in Europe]” (“The Terrorism Acts in 2015”, 
para 2.7).  
13
 Ibid, Anderson Report, 2016, at 101, C Walker, Annex 2, para 6.  
14
 Changes to Modus Operandi of Islamic State Revisited Europol November 2016, section 5: “Intelligence 
suggests, however, that IS has also put together teams in Syria which are sent to the EU tasked with carrying out 
attacks”.  
5 
 
      It should not be assumed, however, that all persons who have left Britain to travel to 
territory held by ISIS or linked groups would pose a risk to the UK if they return. Having 
witnessed the barbarities of ISIS or other similar groups, some returnees may have rejected 
their ideology and may have managed to escape with great difficulty from ISIS-held 
territory.
15
 Hegghammer has pointed out that not all extremist Sunni clerics support out-of-
theatre attacks in the West;
16
 but while such attacks are not necessarily typical of Islamic 
militancy world-wide, ISIS leaders have strongly and consistently supported them;
17
 ISIS has 
repeatedly urged its supporters “to kill disbelievers in the West”.18 Given that ISIS recently 
lost, and is still losing, a significant amount of territory,
19
 its ability to portray itself as a state 
is currently diminishing. But that may merely mean, given that “the caliphate” is made up 
partly of FTFs, that the nature of the threat its surviving fighters and supporters pose will 
shift as they disperse to various states, although its loss of prestige may also affect 
                                                          
15
 See The Home Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2013-14, Counter-terrorism, HC 231, at 
paras 48-51. Samra Kesinovic, 18, was reportedly murdered by Islamic State fighters when she tried to leave 
ISIS-held territory to return to Austria: Chris Perez: “Austrian Jihadi bride beaten to death after trying to escape 
ISIS” New York Post, 24.11.15.  
16
 “Abdallah Azzam, the influential Palestinian cleric described as ‘the mentor of Usama bin Ladin’, never 
called for nor organized any out-of-theater attacks during his eight years of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan 
in the 1980s”: Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of 
Jihad”, (2011) 35(3) International Security 53–94. 
17
 “Among the Islamist terrorist organisations known to EU law enforcement agencies, ISIS is one of the few 
that explicitly targets Western countries”: the Europol Report, supra note 14, section 2. Islamist extremists have 
inspired the overwhelming majority of over 40 terrorist plots which have been disrupted since the London 
bombings of 2005 (Counter-extremism strategy 2015, Command Paper Cm 9148, October 2015, para 5). ISIS 
claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks of 13.11.15: see: “ISIS claims responsibility for Paris attacks, calling 
them miracles” the New York Times 14.11.15 (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-
responsibility-for-paris-attacks-calling-them-miracles [last accessed 20.4.17]). Europol records the thwarting in 
France, in 2014, of “at least two attack plots involving individuals that had returned from Syria”, and arrests for 
attack planning in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands: TE-SAT Terrorism situation and trend report, 2015, at 2.1. 
See a study of ISIS-related attack plots in Western Europe, North America and Australia 2011-June 2015, 
Thomas Hegghammer and P. Nesser, “Assessing the Islamic State’s commitment to attacking the West”, (2015) 
Perspectives on Terrorism, vol 9 no. 4, (the Terrorism Research Initiative), which concluded that there had been 
“more plots involving only IS sympathisers than returned foreign fighters” but that “the organisation’s 
formidable resources and verbal hints at future attacks give reason for vigilance”; “The Terrorism Acts in 2014: 
the Report of the Independent Reviewer” September 2015, para 2.12. 
18
 Y Bayoumy “Isis urges more attacks on Western ‘disbelievers’”, the Independent 22.9.14, reporting that ISIS 
spokesperson Abu Muhammad Al Adnani issued a fatwa in 2014 to followers to “rise up against Westerners and 
rig the roads with explosives for them….Raid their homes. Cut off their heads”. David Anderson (ibid, 2015) 
has noted: “Through media outputs, ISIL has inspired the increase in unsophisticated but potentially deadly 
attack methodologies…seen recently in Australia, France, Canada, Denmark and the USA”, para 2.11. 
19
 ISIS (Daesh) is at present predominantly based in Syria and Iraq, but its territory in those states has 
diminished significantly (by about 30%) due to military action since ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-
Adnani declared in June 2014 that it had established an Islamic caliphate, with its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
the self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim (see Counter-extremism strategy, Cm 9148, October 2015, 22). See also B 
Powell, “As Isis’s caliphate crumbles, jihadi tactics are evolving”, the Independent, 23.10.16. A report by IHS 
conflict monitor “Islamic State Caliphate shrinks by 16% in 2016”, 9.10.16, found that ISIS had lost about 16% 
of the territory it held in January 2016, and overall had lost just over a quarter of the territory it had controlled in 
January 2015.  
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recruitment. The expected eventual military destruction of the “caliphate” is therefore likely 
to lead to an increase in the number of would-be returnees who have become more intensely 
radicalised and have experienced weapons training.
20
 It has been found that militants usually 
“do not leave intending to return for a domestic attack, but a small minority acquire that 
motivation along the way and become more effective operatives on their return”.21  
 
      So the terrorist threat in Britain appears to come partly from nationals who have travelled 
abroad to support ISIS, and may return,
22
 although the fact of leaving to do so is far from the 
only indicator that an ISIS-supporter poses a risk.
23
 Of those ISIS-supporters (or supporters of 
similar groups) who left the UK for Syria or Iraq,
24
 about half have already returned,
25
 
meaning that quite a large number, who survive the conflict, are likely in future to seek to do 
so.  
 
TEOs as a compromise response to the FTF threat 
 
     The designation of the terror threat level in the UK was raised from substantial to severe 
in 2014,26 and in that year, in the wake of atrocities committed by ISIS, and in response to 
fears that returnees from fighting with or supporting ISIS would receive training abroad and 
                                                          
20
 See: B Powell, ibid; Europol Report November 2016 (supra note 14). 
21
 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I stay or should I go?” (2013) 107 American Political Science Rev 1,10. Cf 
Seth Jones, The Extremist Threat to the U.S. Homeland (Santa Monica: RAND, 2014); see further J. Skidmore, 
Foreign fighter involvement in Syria (Herzliya: ICT, 2014); Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, Analysis and 
Recommendations re the Global Threat from FTFs (New York: S/2015/358, 2015). 
22
 See note 25. MI5 reported in March 2015 that the number of UK-linked individuals who were involved in or 
had been exposed to terrorist training and fighting was higher than it had been at any point since the 9/11 attacks 
in 2001 (see “The Terrorism Acts in 2014: the Report of the Independent Reviewer” September 2015, paras 
2.10, 2.13). The Home Affairs Committee (2013-14 Report, para 40) found concurring evidence to the effect 
that the fact of being a returnee from fighting with ISIS or similar groups was a relatively strong predictor of 
likelihood of taking part in terrorist plots: “Hegghammer found that on average, one-in-nine FTFs returned 
home to take part in a domestic terror plot…plots with foreign fighters are more likely to reach fruition and 
twice as likely to have a lethal impact…a one-in-nine radicalisation rate would make foreign fighter experience 
one of the strongest [known] predictors of individual involvement in domestic operations”. 
23
 Supra note 17. 
24
 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation estimated in 2015 that about 500-600 UK citizens 
had left to support ISIS in Syria/Iraq: Report 26.1.15. (But see now note 25). See also “CONTEST: Annual 
Report for 2014”, (Cm 9048, March 2015), which inter alia made reference to people with extremist connections 
who had travelled to Syria and Iraq, some of whom have combat experience and terrorist-related training. It also 
referred to ‘the continued threat from al-Qaida core, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabaab’.  
25
 The terrorist threat was summarised in “CONTEST: Annual Report for 2015” Cm 9310 July 2016, which 
referred (para 1.4) to about 850 persons who had travelled to Syria and Iraq, of whom about half had returned. 
26
 On 29.8.14 (see MI5 Press Release “Threat level to the UK from international terrorism raised to severe”). 
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would seek to mount terror attacks in Britain
27
 or Europe or radicalise others, the then Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, announced that the government would bring forward a 
“discretionary power to allow us to exclude British nationals from the UK”.28 At the time the 
UK was already able to deprive suspect dual nationals, or those with the potential ability to 
acquire another nationality, of citizenship, thereby permanently excluding them from the 
UK.
29
 The Prime Minister was therefore - it must be assumed - referring mainly to suspect 
“mono-nationals”, taking that term to refer to non-dual nationals and those nationals without 
that potential ability (that is also the sense, for brevity, in which this term will be used 
below). Provision therefore was to be included in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill to 
strip persons who had gone to fight with or support ISIS of citizenship, even if they were 
born in Britain and mono-nationals.
30
 The rationale, clearly, was that some of the persons in 
question had by their actions not only demonstrated an intention to renounce their 
citizenship,
31
 but had supported ISIS’s murder of British citizens abroad,32 and had sought via 
social media to encourage others to leave to support ISIS,
33
 or to commit acts of terror in 
Britain. But proposals to revoke citizenship became mired in conflict between the 
Conservative leadership and the Liberal Democrats while they were in coalition,34 and the 
legality of so doing was in doubt. The introduction of provision to strip British mono-
nationals of citizenship if they have gone abroad to support ISIS or similar groups has not 
been pursued: even when, after the 2015 General Election, the new Conservative government 
was freer to consider taking that step, it did not seek to do so.
35
  
 
                                                          
27
 Theresa May (second reading, House of Commons, 2.12.14 Col. 207): “We face the very serious prospect 
that British nationals who have fought with terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq will seek to radicalise others, or 
carry out attacks here. We have already seen the appalling murder of four civilians outside the Jewish Museum 
in Brussels, and the recent attack on the Canadian Parliament was a shocking reminder that we are all targets for 
these terrorist organisations”. 
28
 Hansard 1.9.14: Column 26. Official Report: Vol. 585, c.26. 
29
 See note 115 and associated text.  
30
 Consideration of the practicality of withdrawal of citizenship was recommended by the Home Affairs 
Committee “Counter-terrorism Seventeenth Report”, HC 231, 30.4.14, paras 96-100. 
31
 E.g. they had torn up their passports in ISIS propaganda videos posted on Youtube. 
32
 E.g. the beheading of Alan Henning: see “Alan Henning killed by Islamic State” BBC News online 4.10.14. 
The attack in Sousse, Tunisia, claimed by ISIS, on 26.6.15 killed 38 people, 30 of them British. 
33
 E.g. Tareena Shakil was convicted of ISIS membership and of encouraging acts of terror on social media 
(under s 1 Terrorism Act (TA) 2006): BBC News online 29.1.16. 
34
 See Patrick Wintour “Cameron shelves move to ban jihadists coming to UK” the Guardian, 1.9.14; Jon Craig 
“Doubts about legality of snatching passports” Sky News, 1.9.14.  
35
 For clarity – the reference is to mono-nationals who are not covered by the British Nationality Act 1981 
s40(4A). See note 114, below.  
8 
 
      The introduction of TEOs thus represented a compromise: that original proposal from 
David Cameron as to permanent exclusion of FTFs from the UK – citizenship-stripping – was 
dropped. Nevertheless, the Bill still placed an emphasis on the exclusion of suspect nationals 
from the UK, albeit on a temporary basis. The aims underlying the Bill then underwent a 
further reconceptualization during the Parliamentary process: the emphasis on such exclusion 
was largely replaced by an emphasis on managing the TEO subject’s return under the scheme 
now created by CTSA 2015 Part 1 Chapter 2.
36
 Management of the return now appears to be 
the primary aim of the scheme, as enacted, although not as originally proposed.
37
 But 
remnants of its exclusion element remain – partly, it is suggested, as a face-saving and 
popularity-seeking exercise to obscure the doubtful basis for the then Prime Minister’s 
original hasty pledge. But other aims may have been at play, as discussed below, possibly 
reminiscent of those underlying the creation of CIA “dark sites”.38 TEOs enable the suspect 
to be prevented from returning to the UK for a period until a “permit to return” can be issued, 
specifying the manner and timing of the return, or until he or she agrees to an interview 
abroad; the orders can also make provision for managing the risk he or she may pose on 
return. No ultimate time limit on the full period of exclusion from the UK is specified. 
 
TEOs and the global threat from terrorism  
 
     The TEO scheme therefore relies on the highly questionable notion that another state 
might take responsibility for a period for British terrorist suspects who could be received 
back into the UK. That stance could be seen as reneging on Britain’s responsibility as part of 
the international community to combat terrorism in general; TEOs appear to represent an 
attempt to protect Britain in a unilateral sense, rather than acting as part of an international 
struggle against terrorism. The temporary exclusion of its own nationals could also put 
Britain as the excluding state in breach of its international law obligations to other States, and 
                                                          
36
 In the Home Affairs Committee “Counter-terrorism: Seventeenth Report”, HC 231, 30.4.14, para 98 et seq, 
government proposals for removing British citizenship from foreign terror suspects, leaving them stateless (by 
Clause 18 Immigration Bill 2014), were considered; however, the plans were criticised for being reactive policy-
making (para 101) and the House of Lords rejected the amendment (HL Deb, Vol 753, Col 1167, 7 April 2014). 
The Home Affairs Committee further observed that it would still be necessary to find a state willing to receive 
the suspects, limiting the utility of such a measure (para 101). See also note 37. 
37
 Annex 2 to David Anderson’s 2016 Report, by Professor Clive Walker, argued that “the measures [in the 
form in which they emerged in CTSA] now embody a mode of regulated re-entry and residence rather than 
some variant of exile”, December 2016 Report (supra note 12), para 20(d).  
38
 See Johan Steyn “Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole” (2004) Vol. 53(1) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1-15. See also notes 163 and 164. 
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of positive obligations imposed on states by UN Security Council resolutions in relation to 
terrorism.
39
 The Security Council recently called on member states to tackle the problem 
represented by terrorist groups operating in Iraq and Syria. It said that member states should: 
“…prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals 
who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the 
perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or 
receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities…”. It 
went on to stress: “the particular and urgent need to implement this resolution with respect to 
those foreign terrorist fighters who are associated with ISIL, Al-Nusrah Front and other cells, 
affiliates, splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida…”.40 However, this resolution did not 
cover excluding returning fighters from their state of nationality, even on a temporary basis. 
So the “managed return” and domestic monitoring aspects of TEOs cohere with this call, but 
not the temporary exclusion aspect. The same strictures were also captured in the draft 
Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, but 
while its intention is inter alia that travelling to support terrorism should be criminalised, 
again temporary exclusion from a state is not covered.
41
 The introduction of TEOs could also 
raise concerns as to the propriety of the global struggle against terrorism since it could result 
in violations of the ICCPR and ECHR, and doubts as to the claimed jurisdictional 
competence of the UK in respect of those Treaties, as discussed below. 
   
Security, travel restrictions and citizenship deprivation globally 
     
     The idea that the geographical location of a terrorist suspect has relevance to national 
security is not confined to the UK. Reliance on citizenship deprivation to protect security,
42
 
and of measures restricting travel to limit the mobility of terrorist suspects (supported, as 
                                                          
39
 See the Joint Committee on Human Rights Report “Legislative Scrutiny Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Bill” 5th Report of Session 2014-2015, HL Paper 86, HC 859; Professor Goodwin-Gill said, “a State which 
excludes its own nationals is resorting to a unilateralism which is at odds with the collective endeavour of 
international rights protection as well as internationally agreed efforts to counter terrorism” (paras 3.4, 3.5).  See 
also UN Security Council Resolution 688 of 2014 (S/2014/688). 
40
 UNSCR 2178; Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/2014/23, 19.11.14. 
41
 COD-CTE (2015). Representatives of Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, and the EU, 
signed the Additional Protocol in Riga, Latvia, 22.10.15. It focussed on tackling the problem of “foreign 
terrorist fighters” and covers intentionally participating in a terrorist group, receiving training for terrorism, 
travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, funding or organising such travel. 
42
 See Lucia Zedner, “Citizenship Deprivation, Security and Human Rights”, (2016) Journal of Migration and 
Law 1-16, 6. 
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mentioned, by the Security Council), is currently being introduced and explored in a range of 
democracies. But the introduction of temporary exclusion orders as well as citizen 
deprivation ones has not yet occurred in other Western democracies facing an influx of FTF 
returnees. France recently contemplated introducing a measure allowing citizenship-stripping 
even of suspect mono-nationals in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks, but eventually 
abandoned the plans,
43
 although it introduced lesser emergency, derogating, non-trial-based 
measures.
44 Australia introduced powers to deprive dual nationals of citizenship on security 
grounds under the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 2015. In 
2014 the Australian Parliament also passed the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment 
(Foreign Fighters) Act 2014 which does not include powers to exclude citizens, but created 
amendments to the Australian Passports Act 2005, including introducing the power to 
suspend a person`s Australian travel documents for fourteen days. A new offence of entering 
a “declared area” was also created, covering areas in which a terrorist organisation is 
engaging in hostile activity. Canada has passed legislation allowing the government to 
deprive dual nationals of citizenship for security reasons under the Strengthening Canadian 
Citizenship Act 2014. Canada also recently passed the Anti-Terrorism Act 2015; amongst the 
package of measures introduced was provision to prevent non-citizens who pose a threat from 
entering and remaining in Canada.  
 
     Notoriously, President Trump issued an executive order in January 2017 affecting non-US 
citizens, restricting travel from seven Muslim majority states for 90 days, which was then 
struck down by a Federal Appeals court.45 It stands out from the other measures mentioned 
since it was not necessary to be a terrorist suspect to be affected by it. Travel restrictions also 
                                                          
43
 The Constitutional Reform Bill came before the French Senate on 10.2.16; a clear majority of MPs in the 
lower House of Parliament approved the measures, which included removing citizenship from French national 
convicted terrorists, but they were abandoned on 30.3.16 after criticism from the President’s own party. 
44
 France instituted a number of emergency measures (etat d'urgence) in 2015 after the Paris attacks 
accompanied by a derogation under Article 15 ECHR. See: Declaration contained in a Note verbale from the 
Permanent Representation of France, 24 November 2015, registered at the Secretariat General on 24 November 
2015 – Or. Fr. The French Government decided, by Decree No. 2015-1475 of 14.11.15, to apply Law No. 55-
385 of 3 April 1955 on the state of emergency. Decrees No. 2015-1475, No. 2015-1476, No. 2015-1478 
14.11.15, No. 2015-1493, No. 2015-1494 18.11.15, and Law No. 2015-1501 20.11.15 defined a number of 
measures that can be taken by the administrative authorities. The state of emergency was extended and renewed 
again on 15.12.16 for an additional seven months. The expanded emergency powers allow for: reliance on 
“assigned residence orders” which are similar to control orders; immediate house arrest without authorization 
from a judge, if persons are considered a risk. 
45
 Trump’s executive order was signed on 27.1.17 (see “Donald Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration – the 
full text” the Guardian 28.1.17 (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/27/donald-trump-executive-
order-immigration-full-text [last accessed 20.4.17]); it was struck down by the 9th Circuit Federal Appeals 
Court on 9.2.17; at the time of writing a new order is about to be issued.   
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feature in measures on the control orders model; originating in the UK, they have recently 
become much more widespread.
46
 So while other democracies have so far stopped short of 
introducing schemes capable of excluding their own terrorist suspect mono-nationals from 
the country, even on a temporary basis, measures excluding suspect nationals from their 
home states and also limiting travel of suspects are proliferating globally. 
 
TEOs: the legal framework 
 
Imposition requirements: imprecise and over-broad 
 
     TEOs can be imposed on persons who have a right of abode in the UK, and are abroad,
47
 
if the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that the individual is, or has been, involved in 
terrorism-related activity (TRA) abroad,
48
 and also reasonably considers that it is necessary to 
impose a TEO for purposes connected with protecting the public in the UK from a risk of 
‘terrorism’49 as defined in s1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA).50 It is crucial that the 
definition of a person reasonably suspected of TRA should be precise since such a person 
could potentially be subjected to a lengthy period of exclusion from the UK. But the 
definitions of ‘terrorism’ under s1 TA, on which it is centrally based, and of TRA, are 
themselves broad and imprecise.
51
  
 
                                                          
46
 Measures on the control orders model, introduced in the UK in 2005 (supra note 6) were then introduced or 
are about to be in a range of EU states: for example, in Bulgaria under a July 2016 draft Law on Counter-
terrorism; France relies on ‘assigned residence orders’ (supra note 44); the Netherlands has introduced a draft 
Bill, the Temporary Administrative Powers Counter-Terrorism Bill (Temporary Powers Bill) 2016, to introduce 
measures similar to control orders. The German government intends to electronically tag all the people on the 
country’s terror watchlist (“Germany to Electronically tag all people on terror watch-list” G Chazan, Financial 
Times 1.2.17). Control orders had somewhat similar counterparts in Canada (Security Certificates) and Australia 
(preventative detention orders in the Criminal Code Act 1995, schedule 1, Anti-Terrorism Act No 2 2005). 
47
 S2(5),(6) Conditions C and D. The right of abode arises under the Immigration Act 1971, s2. 
48
 S2(3), Condition A. 
49
 S2(4) Condition B. 
50
 S14(2) CTSA. 
51
 TRA is defined in s14(4) CTSA, echoing the previous definition in TPIMA s4(1) (however, it was narrowed 
under s20(2) CTSA): the definition now does not cover a person where he/she supports A who encourages B, 
when it is only B who is involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. But s14(4) 
retains the broad definition. See criticism of the definition of TRA by David Anderson, “Report on the 
Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006”, 1.12.16, para 4.2. 
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      In R v F
52
 the Court of Appeal found that the requirement of influencing a “government” 
in s1 TA was not limited to democratically elected governments – the “apparent nobility” of a 
terrorist cause in taking action to further democracy against a repressive dictatorship would 
not mean that those concerned fell outside the definition. When the Supreme Court also 
looked at the width of s1 in 2013
53
 it confirmed that finding, while noting that the current 
definition of terrorism was “concerningly wide”.54 S1(1) relies on the relatively quite relaxed 
standard that the action or threat in question need only be designed to “influence” a 
government or international organization under s1(1)(b), while dropping even that 
requirement (or that of intimidating the public) if firearms or explosives are used, under s 
1(3).
55
 The width of the definition means that while TEOs are aimed at persons who have 
gone abroad to support ISIS or similar groups that would clearly fall within s1 TA, s2(1), 
CTSA is clearly over-inclusive as covering at face value a range of persons who have no 
connection to ISIS and may oppose its ideology. It would cover, for example, a British citizen 
abroad who supports the PKK and has aided Kurdish groups in Syria fighting ISIS, as well as 
some groups opposing both the Assad regime and Salafist groups in Syria. It would in theory 
apply to members of groups (if abroad) entirely unlinked to Islamic terrorism, such as 
citizens aiding international environmental groups advocating direct action. While it is almost 
inconceivable that TEOs would be used against members of such groups, the unnecessarily 
broad reach of the scheme - if it was deployed - renders it vulnerable to the argument that its 
reach fails proportionality demands under the ECHR
56
 or the ICCPR. 
 
      Imposition of a TEO is initially in executive hands, and court permission is not needed at 
that point if the case is urgent, as it normally would be,
57
 although court review is 
                                                          
52
 [2007] EWCA Crim 243. 
53
 In R v Gul (Appellant) [2013] UKSC 64, 23 October 2013. See Alan Greene, “The Quest for a Satisfactory 
definition of terrorism: R v Gul”, (2014) 77(5) Modern LR 780-793.  
54
 R v Gul ibid, para 38. See also David Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA 
Civ 6 in which the Court of Appeal interpreted the definition more narrowly to exclude some journalistic 
activity, while finding that Schedule 7 TA had been deployed for a lawful purpose in the case of Miranda. 
55
 These points are considered at length in David Anderson’s 2014 Report “the Terrorism Acts in 2013”, chapter 
10. 
56
 E.g. this point could arise in relation to government arguments seeking to justify imposition of a TEO under 
Article 8(2) ECHR in response to a challenge under s6 HRA by UK-based relatives of a TEO-subject detained 
abroad. 
57
 S2(7). Condition E is that court permission for the TEO has been given, unless the Secretary of State 
reasonably considers that the case is urgent (see note 58). 
13 
 
subsequently required.
58
 The review is governed by Civil Procedure Amendments (CPA)
59
 to 
the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), which have been made under Sched 3 CTSA.
60
 The review 
can be conducted in private,
61
 in the absence of the applicant, who would normally still be 
abroad at that point,
62
 without notification to applicants, and without affording them the right 
to make representations at it, via their legal representatives.
63
 The oversight provided at the 
initial court review while the TEO subject is still abroad is of a very minimal nature,
64
 and of 
doubtful Article 6 ECHR-compliance for that reason, bearing in mind also its reliance on 
closed material. Under the CPA rules the court must ensure that a summary of that material 
does not contain material which it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose.
65
 Due 
to the use of the term ‘public interest’ that is a broader provision than s8(1)(c) Justice and 
Security Act 2013 which provides, once closed material proceedings are declared (s6(1)), that 
“the court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed if it considers that 
[its] disclosure…would be damaging to the interests of national security”. The model of 
imposition used is based partly on the wording that was used in the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 for imposing control orders and is now, with modification, used in the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMA). The standard of proof required to 
impose a TEO is that of reasonable suspicion, as for control orders. That is a lower standard 
than that of reasonable belief,
66
 the standard initially used for imposition of TPIMs (creating 
a “lighter touch” replacement for control orders), which has now, however, been raised to the 
                                                          
58
 If an urgent TEO is imposed without court permission, Schedule 2 applies, providing that immediately after 
giving notice of its imposition, the Secretary of State must refer the imposition of the order to the court (para 
3(1)). 
59
 The Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2015 No 406 (L.3), which came into force on 27.3.15. 
60
 Sched 3 covers “TEO proceedings”: the permission of the court under s2(7); the reference to the court in 
relation to urgently imposed TEOs under Sched 2; the s11 review and appeals: Sched 3 para 1. 
61
 Sched 3 para 10; Rule 88.21 CPA. 
62
 Under Sched 3 para 2(2) (e) and in relation to urgently imposed TEOs, Sched 2 para 2(e): “the relevant court 
[may] conduct proceedings in the absence of any person, including a party to the proceedings” (or his legal 
representative); see also Rule 88.21 CPA. 
63
 S3(3)(4) and Sched 2 para 3(4). Provision is made instead to appoint a Special Advocate (SA): under Sched 3 
special advocates can be appointed to represent the applicant in s3 and s11 proceedings; but Sched 2 governing 
review of initial imposition of a TEO abroad does not mention appointment of an SA.   
64
 Supra note 62. There need not be a ‘hearing’: Sched 3 CTSA, para 2(2)(b); Rule 88.20 CPA. In BA (Nigeria) 
(FC) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] QB 686; the Court of Appeal described 
the pursuit of an appeal from outside the UK as having “a degree of unreality about it”. 
65
 Sched 3 para 4(1)(e); Rule 88.28(6)(b) and Rule 88.28(8). 
66
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v CC, CF [2012] EWHC 2837 reaffirmed that “reasonable 
belief” imposes a higher threshold than that which previously applied under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005 – reasonable suspicion, relying on A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 1 
WLR 414, para 229; R v Saik [2006] 2 WLR 993, para 120. 
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civil standard under the 2015 Act.
67
 Reasonable suspicion represents the lowest standard of 
proof used so far for such non-trial-based measures. The over-broad and imprecise 
requirements for imposition of TEOs are therefore matched by the ease of their imposition.  
 
The ‘management of return’ and exclusion aspects of TEOs 
 
     During the period when the TEO is in force various restrictions can be imposed; it comes 
into force when the individual, who must be abroad at the time, is given notice of its 
imposition,
68
 although notice can also be deemed to have been given.
69
 At that point the 
passport held by the excluded individual is automatically invalidated.
70
 The TEO would then 
normally continue in force while the subject is abroad and need not expire after return to the 
UK,
71
 permitting obligations to be imposed after return. A significant restriction imposed on 
the TEO subject while abroad under s2(1) CTSA is that, on pain of criminal sanctions, he/she 
cannot enter the UK for a period of time once the TEO comes into force, until a permit to 
return is issued.
72
 If notice of the TEO has not been given to the individual, the fact that 
he/she could be deemed to have had notice does not preclude adducing lack of knowledge of 
the order as a defence of reasonable excuse.
73
 But the TEO would still be valid, meaning that 
obligations could then be imposed on the suspect in the UK. The restriction on entering the 
UK is subject to certain safe-guarding provisions relating to deportation and to urgency of 
return. Under s2(1)(b) if the state the individual is in when the TEO is imposed decides to 
deport him, he will be allowed to enter the UK (which would mean that the management of 
return would no longer be under the UK’s control). Under s7(2) if the situation is urgent the 
Home Secretary may, but not must, issue a permit to return,
74
 which may inter alia refer to 
the possibility that the suspect, having been detained abroad as a result of imposition of the 
                                                          
67
 S20(1) CTSA, amending s3(1) TPIMA. 
68
 S4(3)(a). 
69
 The suspect must be given notice of the imposition of the TEO (s13) except where S.I. 2015/438 Temporary 
Exclusion Orders (Notices) Regulations 2015 applies. This provision as to notice could cover the situation in 
which intelligence indicates that the suspect is in ISIS-held territory, or is in transit intending to seek to return to 
the UK, but at present the suspect’s whereabouts are not known.  
70
 S4(9). Under s4(10) while it is in force, “the issue of a British passport to the excluded individual while he or 
she is outside the UK is not valid”. 
71
 S9(3)(b). 
72
 The sanction includes the threat of up to five years’ imprisonment if the individual returns in contravention of 
the restriction on return specified in the order, without reasonable excuse: s10(1). 
73
 S10(4). 
74
 If the Secretary of State considers it is expedient to issue a permit to return even though no application has 
been made under s6. 
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TEO, might be subjected to Article 3 ECHR treatment in detention.
75
 The then Home 
Secretary also said in Parliament that if a state such as France or Turkey requested the UK to 
take back suspects without going through the deportation procedure, the UK would take them 
back, but again managing the return.
76
  
 
      Unless one of those possibilities arises, the individual can be given a permit to return to 
Britain under s5 CTSA if he or she complies with the conditions it specifies,
77
 allowing for 
management of the return. The permit must make specific provision about the time, manner 
and place of return to the UK,
78
 meaning that the suspect’s return is monitored and notified to 
border officials or police, and suspects could be added to watch lists, including authority-to-
carry lists.
79
 Under s5(3) the individual’s failure to comply with a specified condition has the 
effect of invalidating the permit to return. If an individual fails to accept such a condition he 
or she could then remain excluded from the UK for a period of time, which could 
theoretically be up to two years under s4(3),
80
 or more, on renewal of the TEO.
81
 
 
      The possibility that a person could be excluded from the UK for a period of years due to 
non-compliance with conditions imposed is, however, subject to the provision of s6(1) which 
covers the situation in which the TEO subject applies for a permit to return.
82
 If so, it must be 
issued, but only if the subject complies with a requirement that can be imposed by the 
Secretary of State - and is likely to be made a condition of return in most or all instances - to 
attend an interview with a police officer or immigration official at a time and a place 
specified by the Secretary of State.
83
 If the applicant applies for a permit and co-operates by 
attending the interview he or she would not be excluded from the UK for more than “a 
reasonable period”, although s6 does not specify how long might be viewed as “reasonable”. 
                                                          
75
 See notes 167 and 181. See also text to note 186.  
76
 Theresa May, 2nd reading House of Commons, 2 December 2014, Column 212. 
77
 S5(2). 
78
 S5(4). 
79
 S22 CTSA enables the Secretary of State to operate an authority-to-carry scheme whereby a carrier must seek 
authority to carry persons on inbound or outbound journeys who come within the scope of the scheme. The 
scheme was introduced under CTSA (Authority to Carry Scheme) Regulations 2015 No. 997. The Authority to 
Carry Scheme (Civil Penalties) Regulations 2015 made under s24(7) CTSA, raises the penalty available to apply 
to carriers. 
80
 Unless it is revoked or otherwise brought to an end earlier. 
81
 The TEO can be renewed after it has expired, if the relevant conditions in s2(1) apply: s4(8). 
82
 S5 could cover TEO subjects not yet traced abroad, since once a subject has been apprehended abroad he or 
she would be likely to apply for a permit to return, coming therefore within s6. 
83
 S6(2). 
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So the subject would at the least be excluded from the UK for some weeks, or possibly 
longer, while the interview and permit to return were being put in place. But if the TEO 
subject does not apply for a permit or refuses to attend the interview that period could be two 
years or more.  
 
      In order to avoid infringing the privilege against self-incrimination under Article 6(1) 
ECHR, the Part 1 provisions, taken at face value, do not require the suspect to answer 
questions at the interview, merely to attend it. The privilege can relate to using compulsion to 
obtain information outside criminal proceedings that is later used in the charging of a person 
with a criminal offence.
84
 If the information was later used in criminal proceedings against a 
TEO subject the privilege might be breached, if an element of compulsion was deemed to 
have been used in the specific sense in which that word is used in the Strasbourg Article 6 
jurisprudence, which may not cover compulsion to attend an interview as opposed to 
compulsion to answer questions.
85
 However, no provision for legal advice, for a legal advisor 
to attend the interview, or for audio-taping it, are made in CTSA, so safeguards against the 
use of compulsion are not apparent. TEO interviews present therefore a strong contrast to 
Schedule 7 TA ones (allowing for stops and questioning at ports, as discussed further below) 
since they are accompanied by a range of safeguards partly contained in an extensive Code of 
Practice.
86
 Even if the information obtained was found to be inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings, it would not be in TPIM ones, allowing a TPIM to be imposed on return; also 
the information could lead to the apprehension of other suspects, or the uncovering of other 
information – so motivation to use compulsion would be present. 
 
The varying aims of TEOs 
 
Controlling the return of the suspect and evaluating the risk posed 
 
     Firstly, as discussed, TEOs are intended to enable management of the subject’s return. The 
subject must engage with the authorities in order to obtain the permit and cannot enter the UK 
except by the permitted route, time and manner. But also they provide an opportunity, via the 
                                                          
84
 See Weh v Austria (2004) 40 E.H.R.R. 890. 
85
 See e.g. O’Halloran and Francis v UK (2007) 46 E.H.R.R. 397, para 62. 
86
 See note 95 and accompanying text. 
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interview, to evaluate the risk he or she may pose on return, enabling it to be managed in the 
UK,
87
 as discussed in III B. The intention underlying ss4 and 5 CTSA, creating the threat of 
being debarred from the UK for a period, which could be substantial, appears to be to ensure 
that the applicant is incentivised to agree to the conditions and attend the interview in order to 
obtain the permit. The exclusion aspect of TEOs is therefore linked in that sense to the 
“managed return” aspect.  
 
     If, as the Annex to the December 2016 Report of the previous independent reviewer of 
terrorism considers to be the case, the “managed return” aspect of TEOs is their dominant 
aspect,
88
 it might be asked why none have been deployed, since in that aspect they are much 
less likely to create the conflicts with the ECHR or ICCPR discussed below. The answer may 
be partly that there are practical problems in deploying TEOs,
89
 and also that the existing 
range of measures, including use of Schedule 7 TA, and the charging of “precursor” special 
terrorism offences,
90
 already offer alternative methods of dealing with the risk posed by 
returning FTFs. It might further be asked why the “exclusion” aspect of TEOs was included 
at all: if management of the return is the main aim of CTSA Part 1 then, rather than imposing 
temporary exclusion to impose the interview, an advance notification of return order could 
have been imposed instead.
91
 Such an order could have been combined with deployment of 
Schedule 7 TA, as amended, allowing for an interview at a UK border, during which, in 
contrast to a TEO interview, failing to answer questions is an offence and reasonable 
suspicion for the stop is not needed.
92
 Such a course might, however, have appeared less 
attractive to the government: the ECHR would obviously apply via s6 Human Rights Act, as 
would the safeguards in the TA itself, which include access to legal advice,
93
 as improved to 
                                                          
87
 The Immigration Minister in evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights suggested that the 
government's main aim under TEOs was not to exclude UK nationals, but to delay the return to the UK of those 
who had gone abroad to fight, in order to manage that return, and deal with the risk to the public posed, although 
managing the return in Britain was not the only aim: Legislative Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, 
para 3.10, James Brokenshire MP, 3.12.14, Q25 (12.1.15, HL Paper 86, HC 859). 
88
 See supra note 37.  
89
 See supra note 9.  
90
 See note 111.  
91
 As proposed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (Legislative Scrutiny: Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Bill (2015)) Report of Session 2014-2015, HL Paper 86, HC 859, para 3.12. 
92
 Under Sched 7 paragraph 18. 
93
 Schedule 8 TA provides certain rights, including the right to consult a solicitor and to have a named person 
informed of the detention.  
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an extent under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014,
94
 and the 2015 
Schedule 7 Code of Practice.
95
 But the fact that the executive would have to accept the 
application of the ECHR in respect of the use of Schedule 7 would only be of relevance if the 
government’s assumption as to its lack of ECHR jurisdiction in respect of TEO subjects 
abroad is correct, something it has reason to doubt, as discussed below. 
 
Management of the suspect after return 
 
     In order to take steps towards managing any risk the suspect poses, “permitted 
obligations” can also be imposed by the Secretary of State under s9(1) CTSA on TEO 
subjects after they have returned to the UK.
96
 The ‘obligations’ refer to a range of conditions 
listed in s9 CTSA, arising under Schedule 1 TPIMA. The conditions in the permit under s9(2) 
could include being required to report to a police station, to notify the police of the place of 
residence and as to changes of address;
97
 they could include a requirement to attend 
appointments, which can now include attending a de-radicalisation programme.
98
 These are 
the less intrusive obligations capable of being imposed under TPIMA, but it is notable that 
they can be imposed on the reasonable suspicion standard under CTSA rather than the civil 
one now required under TPIMA.
99
 The more intrusive ones, including the imposition of 
curfews or of forced relocation,
100
 are not available under TEOs but, clearly, if the requisite 
evidence, possibly deriving from the interview, is present, (depending on proof to the civil 
standard that the person has been engaged in TRA) a TPIM order could instead be imposed 
under TPIMA, meaning that any of the TPIM obligations could be imposed. 
 
Temporary exclusion from the UK 
 
                                                          
94
 Schedule 9 para 2(3) of the 2014 Act amends Schedule 7 to inter alia reduce the maximum period of time a 
suspect can be detained, to 6 hours; Schedule 9 para 3 amends Schedule 7 to disallow intimate searches.  
95
 See “Examining Officers and Review Officers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000” Code of Practice, 
March 2015, up-dated 17.3.16. The Code covers inter alia requirements for reviews of detention, for taking non-
intimate samples and treatment of children. CTSA 2015 also made further changes to the scope of the Schedule 
7 power to examine goods (under s43 and Schedule 8). 
96
 Outlined in s9(2). The notice imposing the obligations comes into force when given to the individual and 
continues in force until the TEO ends (s9(3)). 
97
 S9(2) CTSA refers to Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, para 10. 
98
 Paragraph 10A, inserted by section 19 CTSA. 
99
 See supra note 67. 
100
 See note 104. 
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     The third, less acknowledged, aim of TEOs appears to be to open the possibility of 
excluding suspects from the UK for lengthy periods, for up to two years, or more, bearing in 
mind that the TEO can be imposed without notification to the suspect,
101
 and that no ultimate 
time limit is specified in the Act as to the full period of time during which a person can be 
subjected to repeat TEOs. If the TEO subject has no notice of its imposition and therefore he 
fails to apply for a permit, or in any event he does not apply for one, the requirement to allow 
him to return within a “reasonable” time is not triggered. The addition of that potentially 
lengthy exclusion element appears to rest on the notion that it may have various advantages.  
 
     As TEO subjects would be outside the UK, the state takes the stance, as considered below, 
that it does not have jurisdictional competence for ECHR purposes. No provision is made in 
CTSA as to their detention abroad, leaving the TEO subjects to the responsibility of a host 
state which might not maintain the same standard of rights’ protection as the UK. A range of 
human rights violations could arise in the host state, including of Article 3 ECHR, as 
discussed further below.
102
 For a period of time the obligations of the UK to TEO subjects 
could be suspended – if the government’s stance on jurisdictional competence is correct. If 
the host state was prepared to take responsibility for the TEO subject, he would appear to fall 
under that state’s laws, and his practical ability to trigger or take advantage of the 
mechanisms in CTSA allowing return might be impaired. A situation somewhat similar to 
that created by the placement of persons in CIA “dark sites” might potentially arise if the 
TEO took effect in a state with a record of maltreatment of detainees.
103
 That could have the 
benefit of leading to the acquisition of information by the host state’s security services which 
might be passed to UK security personnel. It might also lead to a situation in which the 
suspect became “lost” in the host state’s prison system, meaning that temporary absence from 
the UK became prolonged.  
 
     A period of exclusion could also disrupt the returnee’s ability to engage physically in 
terrorist activity in the UK while detained abroad, and any conspiracies he or she might have 
engaged in on return would be disrupted, as would association with other suspects. In that 
respect the scheme has aims somewhat similar to those underpinning use of forced relocation 
                                                          
101
 See supra note 69. 
102
 See note 179 and associated text. 
103
 See notes 163, 164 and 185.  
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within the UK under TPIMs.
104
 But any such enhancement of security should be balanced 
against the potential impact of use of TEOs on global security generally. Further, the very 
existence of the exclusion aspect of TEOs, regardless of activation of the scheme, might also 
deter suspects from seeking to return at all from fighting or training with ISIS or similar 
groups.
105
 It could therefore be suggested that TEOs are intended to function on a rhetorical, 
expressive level, in the sense that by creating various hurdles a returning FTF must surmount, 
the TEO regime could by its mere existence create a disincentive to return. But any such 
intention would not comport readily with the aim of managing the return or with the general 
responsibility of Britain to combat terrorism globally, since the suspect’s engagement in 
terrorism would tend to be prolonged. The “managed return” and exclusion aspects of TEOs 
are therefore in some tension with each other.  
 
     The focus of TEOs on retaining a suspect in one physical space outside the territory of the 
UK for a period also creates an inherent limitation in their capacity to enhance security. The 
risk an FTF may pose does not relate only to presence in a physical space; it relates also to 
online efforts at radicalisation
106
 and the fostering of terrorist conspiracies, globally. While 
reliance on TEOs does not precisely amount to exporting terrorism,
107
 it does appear to 
presuppose that security could be enhanced by creating a scheme with the potential to ensure 
that the TEO subject remains outside the UK for a period. In that respect TEOs demonstrate 
continuity with earlier UK detention measures that made similar assumptions about terrorist 
activity and geographical location, including the “three walled prison” concept set up by Part 
4 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, and by the UK government’s efforts to 
deport non-citizen suspects using memoranda of understanding.
108
  
      
     TEOs are also clearly inherently limited in terms of addressing the current security threat 
generally since, while it is partly created by FTF returnees from Syria or Iraq, those who have 
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 S16(1)-(5) CTSA amended paragraph 1, Schedule 1 TPIMA to allow relocation to be imposed. 
105
 See David Anderson’s 2016 Report (supra note 4), on this point: para 20(d). 
106
 As David Anderson has pointed out “The volume and accessibility of extremist propaganda – some of it in 
the form of slickly-produced films – has increased. UK-based extremists are able to talk directly to ISIL fighters 
and their wives in web forums and on social media. The key risk is that this propaganda is able to inspire 
individuals to undertake attacks without ever travelling to Syria or Iraq” (supra note 17, 2015, para 2.11).  
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 See Lucia Zedner, supra note 42, 15. 
108
 See: C Walker, “The Treatment of Foreign Terror Suspects” (2007) 70 MLR 427; J Blackbourn and C 
Walker, “Interdiction and Indoctrination: The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015” (2016) 79 Modern 
Law Review 840, 852. 
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been thwarted in seeking to leave to fight with ISIS or similar groups
109
 may in some 
instances pose a higher threat. Unlike those who have succeeded in leaving, they are less 
likely to be known to the security services. The threat from such persons, or from right-wing 
extremists,
110
 must therefore be left to the attention of “precursor” terrorism offences111 or of 
TPIMs, since as mono-nationals they cannot be subject to the recent policy of determined use 
of deportation for non-national suspects.
112
 TEOs are also largely irrelevant to addressing the 
risk to British citizens posed by Islamic terrorism abroad.
113
  
 
 Lack of a direct role in citizenship-stripping  
 
     TEOs are not intended to broaden the instances in which citizenship-stripping can occur, 
although that possibility has not been entirely ruled out for the future.
114
 The current position 
mentioned above in terms of permanent deprivation of citizenship is formally unchanged by 
the introduction of TEOs: persons whose actions are “seriously prejudicial to the vital 
interests of the UK” can be stripped of citizenship and have their passports withdrawn while 
inside or outside the UK, if they are dual nationals or naturalised citizens who have a 
reasonable prospect of attaining another nationality (British Nationality Act 1981 
s40(4A)).
115
 The conduct of nationals who have fought with or supported ISIS or similar 
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 In some instances that might be either because they have been arrested before they can do so or because their 
travel documents have been seized under Home Secretary’s prerogative powers; or under s1 with Schedule 1 
CTSA which enables police (and other authorised persons) to seize passports and other travel documents 
temporarily from British persons or foreign nationals), given reasonable grounds to suspect an intention of 
travelling for the purpose of involvement in terrorism-related activity abroad.  
110
 See supra note 2. 
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 See David Anderson (“The Terrorism Acts in 2014, Report of the Independent Reviewer”, September 2015), 
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114
 The question of removal of citizenship to combat terrorism in circumstances going beyond those envisaged 
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live one; the 2015 Counter-extremism Strategy (Cm 9148), para 104 stated: “We will review rules on 
citizenship…we will also consider…how we can more easily revoke citizenship from those who reject our 
values” (emphasis added). However, provision of that nature is not at present included in the Counter-extremism 
and Safeguarding Bill 2016-17; see further Counter-Extremism: Government Response to the Committee’s 
Second Report of Session 2016–17, First Special Report of Session 2016–17, HC 756. 
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 The Immigration Act 2014 s66 inserted sub-section 4A: “the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, to become a national of 
such a country or territory” (s4A(c)). Under s66(2) “in reaching a decision to deprive on those grounds, the 
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groups would clearly fall within the “seriously prejudicial” provision, but they would retain 
citizenship unless one of the other conditions applied.  
 
     TEOs could have some indirect linkage with citizenship-stripping but only in the sense 
that imposition of a TEO on would-be returnees might provide an opportunity to determine 
while they were abroad whether s40(4A) of the British Nationality Act could apply.
116
 If one 
of the removal of citizenship categories was found to apply, citizenship could - as a matter of 
domestic law - then be removed while the TEO subject was still debarred from the UK.
117
 
 
The place of TEOs within international human rights’ law 
 
TEO subjects and statelessness  
 
     As discussed, TEOs are not to be equated with citizenship-deprivation orders. The UK 
provisions governing such deprivation are designed to create at least face-value compatibility 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15(1), providing that everyone has 
the right to a nationality.
118
 Compatibility with the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, which provides measures to prevent the creation of new cases of 
statelessness, has - it appears - been achieved since the UK had entered a reservation to 
Article 8,
119
 allowing for the deprivation of the nationality of a naturalised person, now 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Home Secretary can take into account conduct which took place prior to the section coming into force”. It over-
turned the principle from Al-Jedda v SSHD [2013] UKSC 62, [2013] WLR(D) 371 to the effect that an 
individual with only a hypothetical past or future claim to a nationality may not be stripped of citizenship (para 
34). The non-operation of this provision was reviewed by David Anderson in a Report on deprivation of single-
national citizenship, “Citizenship Removal Resulting in Statelessness” (April 2016). 
116
 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported a significant increase in the use of deprivation powers, in 
part due to British citizens travelling to fight in Syria; Alice Ross and Patrick Galey found that in most cases, the 
deprivation orders had been issued whilst the individual was overseas: “Rise in citizenship-stripping as 
government cracks down on UK fighters in Syria”, 23.12.13 
(https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-02-13/home-secretary-waited-until-terror-suspect-was-
abroad-before-stripping-citizenship [last accessed 20.4.17]).   
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 In practice that could render the individual stateless. If so, the 1954 Convention (see note 119) would apply. 
It establishes minimum standards of treatment for stateless people in respect of a number of rights, including, 
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identity, travel documents and administrative assistance. 
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 While Article 15(2) provides that “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality”; see Mirna Adjami 
and Julia Harrington, “The scope and content of Article 15 UDHR”, (2008) 27(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 93-
109. 
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 Article 8(1) provides: “A Contracting State shall not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation 
would render him stateless”. The reservation relates to Article 8(3). Article 7 is intended to prevent citizens 
renouncing citizenship except in certain circumstances. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
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covering the deprivations mentioned above, where the national has a reasonable prospect of 
acquiring another nationality.
120
  
 
     These general international human rights law measures have been taken by the 
government to mean that permanent exclusion of mono-national terror suspects from the UK 
should not be undertaken at present. For that reason, as mentioned above, France also 
recently ruled out exclusion of French FTF returnees.
121
 TEOs could, however, potentially 
place persons in limbo as far as their nationality is concerned, with no territory to return to for 
a period of time, except the community of fighters termed ISIS (or a similar group) which is 
not recognised as a state. The question then is whether a measure making a person in effect 
stateless, even on a temporary basis, might be contrary to the international law measures 
mentioned.
122
 It might be said that for a short period of time abroad, once his or her passport 
had been invalidated, and it would be a criminal offence to seek to enter the UK without a 
permit to return, the TEO subject is “stateless” in common parlance.  
 
     But temporary exclusion from the UK of persons suspected of involvement with ISIS, or 
related groups, after reaching, for example, a Turkish airport, to allow identification and 
imposition of a TEO, but with the intention of re-admitting them to the UK when they apply 
to do so, and after they had agreed to an interview, would not appear to infringe international 
law on statelessness. If TEOs are deployed, but detentions abroad are brief – as would be 
probable in practice in most instances since once suspects attend an interview they must be 
allowed to return within a reasonable time – then the impact of TEOs may be said to bear 
little resemblance to a complete revocation of citizenship rendering a person stateless within 
the meaning of the 1961 Convention. Detention and invalidation of the passport create a 
travel restriction, but are not equivalent to a de jure removal of nationality, and the intention 
to admit TEO subjects to the UK, without removal of citizenship, would indicate that no de 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Persons Article 1 defines a stateless person as “a person who is not considered as a national by any State under 
the operation of its law”. See Mathew Gibney, “Statelessness and Citizenship”, esp. at 61,62 in A Edwards & L 
Van Waas (eds) Nationality and Statelessness under International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
120
 See Immigration Act 2014 Explanatory Notes: commentary on s66. 
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 Supra note 43. 
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 Dominic Grieve has pointed out that TEOs could be found to render a person stateless (Hansard, 2.12.14: 
Col 228), but his comment was made before the Act emerged in its final form.   
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facto imposition of statelessness was occurring, since TEO subjects would remain UK mono-
nationals and would therefore be able to establish their nationality.
123
  
 
     Decisions as to citizenship are capable of engaging Article 8 ECHR because nationality is 
part of a person’s identity and therefore relates to their private life,124 but given the likelihood 
that TEOs (if deployed) would impose in most instances brief periods of exclusion from the 
UK, their use would not be viewed as affecting national identity. The same conclusion may 
also be reached as to Article 8(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (bearing in 
mind that some of those who have left Britain to join ISIS or similar groups are children),
125
 
which provides that state parties undertake to “respect the right of the child to preserve his or 
her identity, including nationality…as recognized by law without unlawful interference”.  
 
Arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country 
 
     Use of TEOs to exclude persons for more than brief periods appears, however, potentially 
to be in some tension with the UK’s obligation under the ICCPR Article 12(4)126 to avoid 
arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter a person’s own country.127 Article 12(4) echoes a 
fundamental principle of the common law,
128
 also recognised in the provision against exile in 
Magna Carta, that an individual should be free to reside in his own land.
129
  The UN Human 
Rights Committee ruled in 1999 that “there are few, if any, circumstances in which 
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 See further W. E. Conklin Statelessness: the Enigma of an International Community (Hart, London, 2014) 5 
and Chap 4. 
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 See Genovese v Malta (App. No. 53124/09), judgment of 11 November 2011, para 30; Karassev v Finland 
(dec.), (App. No. 31414/96), judgment of 12 January 1999, ECHR 1999-II. 
125
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128 In Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2015] UKSC 19 Lord Mance stressed that the status of 
citizenship is “as fundamental at common law as it is in European and international law” (para 97) and referred 
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 Clause 39 of Magna Carta states: “No free man shall be … outlawed or exiled”. See also Dominic Grieve’s 
comments on this issue: 2nd reading HC 2 December 2014, Column 228.  
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deprivation of the right to enter one's own country could be reasonable.”130 Obviously, unlike 
citizenship deprivation, imposition of a TEO does not annul a widely accepted incident of 
citizenship, namely the ability to return to one’s home country. But in creating the potential 
to prevent that return for a considerable period of time, a TEO could create an interference 
with that ability akin to the impact of citizenship deprivation. Amnesty International found in 
2017 that such orders “temporarily exclude from their home those who have a right to live in 
the UK, in contravention of the right to freedom of movement and the right to return to one’s 
own country”.131 Nevertheless, it is not yet established in international law that a temporary 
deprivation of the ability to enter one’s own country would create a violation of Article 12(4), 
bearing in mind that, as discussed, TEOs presuppose that the TEO subject can return within a 
“reasonable” period.  
 
Jurisdictional competence under the ECHR, ICCPR, Human Rights Act 
 
     As is well established in international human rights law in general, the scope of human 
rights’ obligations is essentially determined by territoriality, but there are certain exceptions 
whereby states may be found to have such obligations beyond their borders to persons not on 
the state’s territory, but within the power or effective control of the state. State parties’ 
obligations under the ICCPR are limited under Article 2 to “all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction”.132 The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) has interpreted 
Article 2 to mean that “a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the 
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party”.133  
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 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of movement (Art.12),  
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     Similarly, Article 1 ECHR sets limits on the reach of the Convention since it only applies 
to everyone within the “jurisdiction” of a contracting party.134 The term “jurisdiction” was 
originally seen by some contracting states as referring to the presence of persons on the legal 
territory of the contracting state in question.
135
 But the concept of territoriality, echoing the 
position adopted by the HRC, has partially been replaced by a concept of jurisdiction not 
necessarily linked to such presence, although the legal space so delineated is not fully 
clear.
136
 The territorial reach of the ECHR under the Human Rights Act, as opposed to that of 
the ECHR as determined at Strasbourg, appears to mirror the Strasbourg concept of 
jurisdiction, but not to go further than it does.
137
  
 
     A state can be found to have ECHR jurisdiction, first when it exercises effective control 
over an area outside its national territory,
138
 and second where its agents exercise a degree of 
authority over persons on the territory of another state, but not effective control over territory. 
As to the first exception to territoriality, states’ obligations to secure the rights in such an area 
derives from the fact that they are exercising effective control there, whether that is done 
directly, through the state’s armed forces,139 or through a subordinate local administration. 
Thus, detention of enemy combatants in Afghanistan and Iraq was found in 2015 by the 
Court of Appeal to breach Article 5 ECHR
140
 on the basis that, due to the presence of British 
soldiers, the UK was found to have effective control over the areas in question.  
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     That first exception is very unlikely to apply in respect of TEOs used in current combat 
zones since returnees may be detained abroad in a third party host state such as Turkey, or in 
parts of Syria or Iraq, where UK ground troops do not exercise control over areas of territory. 
The second exception, however, covers a range of exercises of authority and control over 
persons by one state’s agents on the territory of another141 - personal rather than territorial 
control, although extraterritorial jurisdiction still remains exceptional.
142
 That second 
exception, based on the “personal model of jurisdiction”,143 can arise if a state exercises 
executive public powers on the territory of another state by agreement with the state in 
question.
144
 In Banković v Belgium and others145 NATO forces had bombed a Radio station 
in Belgrade, killing members of the families of the applicants. The Grand Chamber found that 
there was no jurisdictional link between the persons who were victims of the act complained 
of and the respondent States on the basis that jurisdiction was largely determined by 
territoriality, and the special exceptions in respect of military occupation, or the exercise of 
public powers on the territory of another state by agreement with that state, did not apply.   
      
     But in Ocalan v Turkey
146
 jurisdictional competence was found on the basis that Kenyan 
officials had handed over the applicant to Turkish officials operating in Nairobi airport who 
had arrested him and forced him to return to Turkey. The Court distinguished Banković on 
the basis that the applicant was subject to a continuing exercise of the authority and control of 
the Turkish officials after his arrest. Turkey clearly lacked effective control over any part of 
Kenyan territory, but “directly after being handed over to the Turkish officials by the Kenyan 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
government for wrongful detention after being captured by British troops in 2010. The Judges upheld the claim 
that under Article 5 ECHR he could not be held for longer than 96 hours; he was detained for four months. 
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officials, the applicant was under effective Turkish authority and therefore within the 
‘jurisdiction’ of that State”, even though Turkey had exercised its authority outside its 
territory.
147
 Ocalan therefore focused more closely than Banković on the exercise of such 
control on another state’s territory. Similarly, in Medvedyev and Others v France148 the Court 
held that the applicants were within French jurisdiction by virtue of the exercise by French 
agents of full and exclusive control over a ship and its crew from the time of its interception 
in international waters. 
 
     The scope of this exception was confirmed in the Grand Chamber decision in Al-Skeini v 
UK which relied on this more expansive conception of Article 1.
149
 The claims in Al-Skeini 
were brought in respect of civilians killed in Iraq. The Grand Chamber found: “Following the 
removal from power of the Ba’ath regime and until the accession of the Interim Government, 
the UK…assumed in Iraq the exercise of some of the public powers normally to be exercised 
by a sovereign government. In particular, the UK assumed authority and responsibility for the 
maintenance of security in South East Iraq”. The judgment concluded that “whenever the 
State through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus 
jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the 
rights and freedoms under…the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that 
individual”.150 That was a bold, unequivocal statement of principle, apparently fixing a state 
with jurisdiction whenever it exercises authority and control over an individual outside its 
territory, even without the agreement of the other state, and even outside the legal space of 
the contracting states (espace juridique).
151
 The “authority and control” test from Al-Skeini 
for jurisdiction has recently received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in the UK on two 
occasions.
152
 The decisive factor in these post- Banković decisions was found to be the 
exercise of physical power and control by agents of one state over the persons in question on 
the territory of another. 
 
                                                          
147
 Ibid, para 91. 
148
 (GC), (App. No. 3394/03), judgment of 29 May 2010, para 67. 
149
 Al-Skeini and others v UK (App. No. 55721/07), judgment of 7 July 2011. For discussion see Marko 
Milanovic, “Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg”, (2012) 23(1) EJ IntL 121-139. 
150
 Ibid, para 149; paras 136–137.  
151
 See supra note 145. 
152
 Smith v The Ministry of Defence (JUSTICE intervening) [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] AC 52; R (on the 
application of Sandiford) (Appellant) v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
(Respondent) [2014] UKSC 44, paras 20, 22. 
29 
 
 TEOs and jurisdictional competence  
 
     The government differentiates between citizenship-stripping and TEO imposition in that 
while it considers that the ECHR does not apply extra-territorially in the former instance, it 
finds that to be the case a fortiori in relation to TEO-imposition: “Compared with 
deprivation, temporary exclusion involves a manifestly less significant interference with an 
individual’s ability to request the UK’s assistance overseas or to travel to the UK”.153 
Goodwin-Gill, however, has argued in relation to citizen-stripping, not TEO imposition, 
while a citizen is abroad that in so doing the UK is inevitably engaging in an exercise of 
jurisdiction over the subject and that therefore, contrary to the view of the government, such a 
person could rely on the ECHR against the UK.
154
 A somewhat similar argument, partly 
founded on Al-Skeini, could also be applied to the imposition of a TEO abroad on the basis 
that the act of imposition may be capable of amounting to an exercise of jurisdiction for 
ECHR and ICCPR purposes, since it represents an exercise of authority and control over an 
individual - albeit of a less profound nature than is represented by citizenship-deprivation - 
and that thereafter jurisdiction cannot be avoided.  
 
     While citizenship-stripping could be covered by the Al-Skeini exercise of “authority and 
control” principle, since it must be implemented by UK officials, not the officials of the host 
state, that principle might not apply so clearly to TEO-imposition. One possibility is that a 
British officials in, for example, Turkey, would directly serve notice of the TEO on the 
recipient, and Turkey would subsequently detain him or her. In that instance the serving of 
the notice, and its causal connection with an exercise of authority and control over the 
recipient, would, it is argued, mean that the UK had not divested itself of its jurisdictional 
responsibility to the subject, even though, in contrast to the situations in Al-Skeini or Ocalan, 
the exercise of such control by UK officials was brief.  
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      But if in contrast UK agents gave notice to Turkish officials that the suspect was about to 
enter Turkey at a certain location, and that the TEO had come into force, although notice had 
not been given to its subject,
155
 whereupon Turkish agents intercepted and arrested him, their 
actions would amount to a direct exercise of authority and control; therefore jurisdictional 
competence could vest in Turkey rather than in the UK. That argument might be accepted at 
Strasbourg, given the focus of the Court, as discussed, on exertion of full physical authority 
and control over persons by agents of one state operating outside its borders. Its basis is that 
such exertion by the agents of one state (in this case, the host state) can or should overwhelm 
the original basis for such exertion, imposed by another state (in this instance due to the 
Home Secretary’s decision to impose the TEO), such that jurisdictional competence passed 
from the UK to the host state. Thus, in Ocalan, if Turkish officials had conveyed to Kenyan 
ones Turkey’s decision that the applicant as a terrorist suspect should be arrested, meaning 
that the Kenyan officials effected the arrest and detention before eventually handing the 
applicant back to Turkey, Turkish jurisdiction probably would not have been found, but the 
original decision of the Turkish authorities could nevertheless have led to purported 
interferences with ECHR rights. 
 
      It is argued, however, that too close a focus on direct physical control of an individual 
risks disregarding the fact that the UK is able to impose a TEO precisely because it has the 
power to do so in the first place. Nevertheless, on this proposed model of jurisdiction, it is 
argued that coercive physical control over an individual would also have to exist, which 
would need to flow directly from the actions or decisions of UK officials, even if they were 
not themselves exercising such control on the territory of another state. Otherwise, any 
decision of UK officials in respect of UK nationals abroad, affecting ECHR rights, which 
such officials had the power to make, could fix the UK with ECHR jurisdictional 
competence. The Supreme Court has made it clear that not every decision of a UK official in 
respect of UK nationals abroad affecting their rights under the ECHR will attract UK 
jurisdictional competence; it found in Sandiford
156
 that it only does so if those officials, not 
the officials of the host state, are exercising authority and control, as in Al-Skeini. In 
Sandiford the Supreme Court found that provision of some Consular assistance to UK 
nationals abroad did not mean that jurisdictional competence arose. Such assistance had been 
rendered to a woman facing the death penalty in Indonesia, but the argument that therefore 
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such competence arose, and so the UK had to abide by Article 6 ECHR by providing funds to 
pay for her legal assistance, was rejected.
157
  
 
     But it was also implicit in Sandiford that if the actions of the host state authorities had 
resulted directly from an exercise of authority over the claimant by UK agents – which in that 
instance they had not – UK jurisdictional competence could have been found. Thus it is not 
the case that if a very close nexus between the acts or decisions of officials of a contracting 
state and potential ECHR violations, as well as violations of jus cogens norms, is found, the 
state may be found to have jurisdictional competence in respect of such acts outside its 
territory, if it cannot be said to be have directly exercised authority and control over those 
individuals.
158
 But it is argued that such competence could be found if the direct exercise of 
authority and control by agents of another state is clearly causally linked to a decision taken 
by the UK executive. TEO imposition occurs due to a decision by the Home Secretary – the 
exercise of authority and control - and then either leads to the coercive control over the TEO 
subject by host state agents or by UK agents operating in the host state. At some point, even 
in the former instance, the TEO subject returns to the control of UK officials, when the 
interview and the permit to return are being put in place, in both instances representing 
exercises of control. It is argued that no true distinction arises between the two cases, 
disallowing UK jurisdictional competence to be imposed in the former instance due to the 
fact that for a period authority and control are exercised by host state agents. It should also be 
pointed out that the policy grounds for denying jurisdiction in cases of some actions by 
European states on foreign territory, or in respect of decisions as to nationals abroad, as in 
Sandiford involving the UK, are not present in the special case of reliance on TEOs against a 
state’s own citizens abroad. 
 
     The UK government, as indicated, takes the stance, however, that any potential violations 
of the ECHR abroad resulting from the imposition of the TEO would be the responsibility of 
the state in question, not of the UK, and would fall under that state’s laws. The 2015 Act was 
passed with the assurance from the Home Secretary – via the s19 HRA statement of 
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compatibility and the ECHR memo accompanying CTSA
159
 – that the TEO provisions are 
ECHR-compatible. The statement of compatibility rested on the claimed jurisdictional barrier 
to reliance on the ECHR rights via the HRA by TEO subjects abroad, on the basis that since 
the subjects would be outside the territory of the UK for a period of time, they would also be 
outside its jurisdiction and therefore unable to rely on the ECHR under the HRA against the 
UK.
160
 The assumption also appeared to be – although obviously that was not stated in the 
ECHR memo - that the ICCPR also would not apply, and nor would principles of the 
common law, on the basis that they would follow the same contours as to jurisdictional 
competence as under the ECHR.
161
 
 
     In the ECHR memo the Home Office contemplated the second exception considered 
above in relation to TEOs, but failed to consider the relevant jurisprudence in full: it relied on 
Khan v UK
162
 which concerned a dual national suspected of terrorism-related activity who 
had been placed in immigration detention but had then left the UK voluntarily for Pakistan. 
He was informed when abroad that his leave to remain had been cancelled. In his application 
to the Strasbourg Court the applicant complained, inter alia, of violations of Articles 2, 3, 5 
and 6 ECHR. In finding his application inadmissible, the Court found that the exceptions to 
territoriality, giving the UK jurisdictional competence, did not apply since Khan had departed 
voluntarily and was not under the control of British officials in Pakistan.  
 
     Khan’s situation was not, however, fully analogous to that of TEO subjects abroad; while 
they have also left the UK voluntarily, the TEO imposition by the Home Secretary is very 
likely to lead to detention in the host state. In contrast to the position in Khan, TEO subjects 
are not therefore likely to be able to move around freely in that state. But in Khan’s case the 
causal connection between cancelling the leave to remain and his claim that he might be 
detained in Pakistan appeared to be missing, given that cancelling the leave would not 
necessarily lead to detention, whereas TEO imposition generally would. The government’s 
assumption as to jurisdiction was straightforwardly based on the proposition that the ECHR 
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will not be engaged extra-territorially if a person has left the UK voluntarily, and is not 
subject to British control when abroad; it did not – as far as the wording of the ECHR memo 
is concerned - take account of the causal relationship between an initial UK exercise of 
authority and control and such subsequent exercise by the host state. 
 
     The intention of the government to escape ECHR responsibility since another state’s 
officials would take responsibility for TEO subjects is somewhat reminiscent of the Bush 
government’s argument (recently alluded to with approval by President Trump)163 justifying 
detention and use of forms of torture in Guantanamo and other “dark sites”, on the basis that 
international human rights’ law and the US Constitution did not apply to offshore sites.164  
TEOs could therefore be viewed merely as devices designed to seek to deflect attention on 
territorial grounds for the UK’s responsibility for the treatment to which the suspect under a 
TEO could be subjected abroad. CTSA Part 1 Chapter 2 itself appears to be designed to avoid 
the implication of jurisdictional competence since it contains no arrest power or provision as 
to detention. The stance taken by the state as to jurisdiction in respect of TEOs implies that 
the executive is seeking to impose – in effect – a less expansive version of Article 1 ECHR 
under the HRA, than could be recognised at Strasbourg.  
 
     In practice, if TEOs were deployed, and a TEO took effect in a non-contracting state 
without direct exertion of authority and control by UK agents operating abroad, the UK 
authorities would, taking account of the position as expressed in the ECHR memo, proceed 
on the basis that they did not have jurisdiction for ECHR purposes. The assumption would be 
that reliance on the ECHR against the UK would be precluded while the subject was abroad. 
He or she would in effect be in a de facto legal “black hole” for a period of time, given that 
UK agents and those of the host state would act in accordance with the assumption that the 
UK had relinquished its responsibility to the subject under human rights law. For example, 
Kenya is a possible host state in respect of TEO subjects who may have left the UK to 
support or fight with Al-Shabaab, so even though international human rights law, including 
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the ICCPR, would apply to Kenyan officials,
165
 the human rights standards being maintained, 
especially in respect of a person who might be deemed an enemy combatant, would not be 
high. The government has stated that it would not seek to impose a TEO or engage in 
agreements related to TEOs in states where the TEO subject might therefore be placed at 
risk,
166
 but it is argued that executive assurances of that nature are insufficient. If instead a 
TEO took effect in a contracting state its police or security services might proceed on the 
assumption that ECHR rights could be relied upon against itself. But its record of human 
rights violations and of compliance with Strasbourg decisions might well be inferior to that of 
the UK in respect of treatment in detention.
167
 Parliament has been told that the UK is 
seeking to reach agreements with Turkey and other possible host states on this matter, 
whereby they would detain TEO subjects,
168
 but no mention has yet been made of the results 
or of reciprocal arrangements between the two states.
169
 Thus the fact that the host state might 
proceed on the basis that it had jurisdictional competence in respect of the subject would not 
preclude the possibility that violations of the ECHR might arise. 
   
     If TEOs are deployed, it is, however, fairly likely to be found eventually in the domestic 
courts that the UK had jurisdictional competence in relation to the TEO-subject while outside 
the UK, following Al-Skeini and the argument above. If therefore the notification of the TEO 
and a subsequent detention was undertaken by officials of another state by agreement with 
the Home Secretary, the UK would not be able to divest itself of responsibility for the 
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treatment of TEO subjects under the HRA.
170
 That would obviously a fortiori also be the case 
if a TEO was imposed on the authority of the UK government with involvement of UK 
officials operating abroad, not only in the TEO’s imposition, but also (possibly in 
combination with officials of the host state) in a subsequent detention, prior to and leading up 
to organising the interview abroad and setting out the conditions in the permit.  
 
     But the UK would not necessarily be deemed to have jurisdictional competence in respect 
of all potential violations of the ECHR abroad relating to TEO subjects, following Al-
Skeini.
171
 If it was found to have such competence in respect of the ECHR rights scheduled in 
the HRA, a scope would be accorded to Article 1 ECHR dissonant with that accorded to it at 
Strasbourg, since the Court in Al-Skeini v UK clearly contemplated situations in which a state 
could act in a manner that would – if jurisdiction was present – create a violation of an 
individual’s ECHR rights, but in which the state was not deemed to have jurisdiction. Al-
Skeini presupposed that the UK could have perpetrated an alleged interference with rights not 
deemed “relevant” to the situation of an individual, since otherwise there would have been no 
need to emphasise the divisibility of the rights.
172
 Presumably in that instance jurisdiction 
would not have been found. The Court therefore contemplates situations in which an exercise 
of authority and control creating potential violations of certain “irrelevant” rights is not found 
to fix the state with jurisdictional responsibility.  
 
ECHR or ICCPR violations stemming from TEO imposition 
 
     The ICCPR is not directly applicable since it is not incorporated into domestic law, 
although it may nevertheless be justiciable, determined on a case by case basis.
173
 The ECHR 
is the directly applicable Treaty as far as the UK is concerned, under the HRA. But the scope 
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of the ECHR in this respect is somewhat narrower than that of the ICCPR or UDHR: there is 
no equivalent in the ECHR of the right under Article 12(4) ICCPR, considered above, not to 
be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter one’s own country. The ECHR also does not 
contain a precise equivalent of Article 10 ICCPR which provides that “All persons deprived 
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person”. It may also be noted that Protocol 4 ECHR, which provides a right to 
freedom of movement, has not been ratified by the UK. 
 
     Detention abroad resulting from TEO imposition would be likely to engage the right to 
liberty under Article 5(1) ECHR and Article 9 ICCPR. Detentions resulting from or 
associated with the imposition of TEOs could fall within one of the Article 5 or 9 exceptions, 
but it would appear that they could not do so if the UK was deemed to have ECHR and 
ICCPR jurisdictional competence in relation to rights relevant to the TEO subject’s situation 
– of which Article 5 would clearly be one - since no exception covers executive detention on 
national security grounds.174 If, contrary to the argument here, the detention was found 
instead to be the responsibility of the host state, the relevant exception would probably be 
Article 5(1)(f) which covers detention of “a person against whom action is being taken with a 
view to deportation or extradition”. It will only cover lengthy detentions, following 
Chahal,175 if during the detention deportation is actively being sought with due diligence.176 It 
would, however, be arguable that if a lengthy detention occurred abroad that exception would 
not cover the situation, because the delay in allowing the TEO subject to enter the UK is not 
entirely consonant with the situation in which deportation is being actively sought, usually 
via negotiations as to assurances regarding treatment on return,177 or while court proceedings 
challenging deportation or extradition are ongoing, since in relation to TEOs the factors 
causing the delay may be within the control of the UK government. If on the other hand the 
                                                          
174
 Following Foka v Turkey (App. No. 28940/09), judgment of 24 June 2008, if the detention was under the 
auspices of UK officials but only covered a period in an airport and then on a plane, Article 5 would be engaged 
due to the element of coercion, but if the applicant was arrested under s41 TA before being detained, the 
exception under Article 5(1)(c) would appear to apply. 
175
 Chahal v UK (1996) 23 E.H.R.R. 413, para 113. In order to detain, deportation proceedings should be in 
being and it should be clear that they are being prosecuted with due diligence. 
176
 See R (on the application of Hardial Singh) v Governor of Durham Prison [1984] WLR 704; A and others v 
UK (App. No. 3455/05), judgment of 19 February 2009, para 164.  
177
 See Othman v UK (2012) 55 E.H.R.R. 1.  
37 
 
delay is caused by the TEO subject who is refusing to attend an interview abroad, it could 
still be argued that deportation is being actively sought.178 
 
     The possibility of arrest and detention abroad flowing from TEO imposition also raises the 
possibility of Article 3 ECHR (or Article 7 ICCPR) treatment.
179
 The Immigration Minister 
has stated that certain states where TEO subjects might be exposed to a risk of Article 3 
treatment are not being approached to create agreements in respect of TEOs.
180
 Ministers 
have also stated that if it was apparent that a particular individual faced a threat of torture in a 
third country, the Secretary of State should not make a TEO.
181
 The ECHR memo further 
stated that the practice of not depriving UK citizens of citizenship when they are not within 
the UK’s jurisdiction if so doing would expose them to a real risk of treatment in breach of 
Articles 3 or 2 ECHR,
182
 would also be followed in respect of the imposition of TEOs.
183
 But 
Turkey was mentioned as a possible host state for persons subject to TEOs. David Cameron 
has previously stressed the need for closer cooperation with Turkey in relation to the problem 
posed by returnees from ISIS-held territory who travel through Turkey.
184
 The problem is that 
under a TEO such persons would probably have to be detained in Turkey. As Liberty has 
pointed out, Turkey’s record on subjecting persons to Article 3 treatment has been criticised a 
number of times
185
 by the UN Committee Against Torture.
186
  
 
     Article 3 has both a procedural and a substantive aspect.
187
 If serious allegations of ill-
treatment are made, the investigation must be both prompt and thorough.
188
 If due to the 
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situation in which the TEO subject remained detained abroad an eventual investigation into 
such allegations was delayed and hampered, meaning that essential evidence therefore could 
not be obtained, that in itself could constitute a breach of Article 3 (raised under the HRA on 
return) in procedural terms,
189
 depending on resolution of the jurisdictional issue in the 
domestic courts. 
 
     If the UK is eventually found to have jurisdictional competence in respect of TEO subjects 
abroad, the state might therefore find itself complicit in the use of Article 3 (or even Article 
2) treatment in Turkey (or a state with a similarly doubtful record on such treatment) against 
a TEO subject in detention. The possibility that a person subject to a TEO might be detained 
abroad and suffer Article 3 treatment there is reflected in s7 of the 2015 Act which provides 
for issuing of permits even without an application for them, in urgent situations;
190
 the 
urgency could arise due to the need to ensure that Article 3 was not breached abroad. But 
obviously that assumes that the person in question is able to communicate effectively with 
British authorities while in detention in another state.  
 
Conclusions 
 
     TEOs are not only based on the model of executive non-trial-based measures that both 
control orders and TPIMs share, they are also part of the counter-terror weaponry which there 
is in reality a strong reluctance to deploy.
191
 Measures on this model, currently manifesting 
themselves in the form of a strengthened version of TPIMs, have nevertheless secured a 
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minor but persistent role, as part of the established and normalised counter-terror tool-kit.
192
 
TEOs are less likely to establish such a role for themselves, but may nevertheless persist, 
possibly with a view to meeting the risks created by a greater influx of returnee FTFs in 
future. They may join other counter-terror measures that have been introduced but not utilised 
post 9/11. A pertinent example is provided by derogating control orders, introduced under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, but never actioned. Similarly, the Enhanced Terrorism and 
Prevention Measures Bill 2012 provides for measures similar to “heavy touch” control 
orders, which has so far merely remained on the books.
193
 
 
      The attempted reconciliation between TEOs and human rights law discussed here is much 
more problematic than it is in relation to TPIMs. This article has pointed out that three 
methods have been explored to reconcile post-9/11 liberty-invading non-trial-based measures 
with international human rights law: reliance on a derogation; reliance on recalibrations of 
rights; and now reliance on lack of jurisdictional competence. While TPIMs are extraordinary 
measures that create some tensions, especially in their newly strengthened form,
194
 with 
human rights, their appearance of constitutionality has some substance which does not rely on 
rights’ recalibration.195 Presentation of the TEO scheme to Parliament as ECHR-compatible 
on the basis of lack of jurisdictional competence, and as acceptable in terms of international 
human rights law generally, also created an appearance of constitutionality, which, as 
Dyzenhaus has argued, may be more dangerous than declaring its complete absence.
196
 But 
any veneer of constitutionality created is thin indeed, as discussed, in contrast to the position 
of TPIMs, influenced from their inception by the process of human rights’ tempering 
undergone by control orders,
197
 to which their recent revival as a niche counter-terror 
measure of practical utility can partly be attributed. If a continuum between counter-terror 
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rhetoric and reality can be envisaged, TEOs therefore sit more towards the former end than 
do TPIMs (and “light-touch” control orders). 
 
      As a result, the relevance of TEOs to the current threat from FTF returnees is clearly in 
doubt. Their complete lack of deployment so far appears to be linked to practical problems,
198
 
the uncertainty as to the question of ECHR and ICCPR jurisdictional competence on which 
the exclusion aspect of the scheme rests, and the lack of agreements with other states. The 
potential role of TEOs appears to have been overtaken by the recent successful deployment of 
precursor terrorism offences to combat the threat posed by returnee FTFs.
199
 TEOs are 
therefore likely to remain un-used or under-used, while still retaining their capacity to 
damage the UK’s reputation in terms of the moral legitimacy of its use of state power against 
terrorism.
200
 If TEOs are ever deployed to combat the threat from ISIS returnees, the legal 
uncertainties and gaps inherent in the scheme may lead to protracted court action reminiscent 
of that which arose in the wake of the introduction of control orders.
201
 As discussed, it is the 
exclusion aspect of TEOs, not the “managed return” one, that could potentially attract such 
litigation. It is concluded therefore that the benefits of the “managed return” aspect of TEOs 
in terms of enhancing security are arguably being rendered of less utility by their exclusion 
aspect due to the jurisdictional ECHR barrier to their use, as discussed. There is therefore a 
strong argument for amendment of the CTSA TEO provisions to reflect their “managed 
return” aspect only, given that in their current form their role, recalling that played by 
derogating control orders and ETPIMs, may be said to form part of a rhetorical counter-terror 
effort, rather than a real one.  
     
     The introduction of TEOs thus appears to owe more to the need for determined or 
belligerent rhetoric in relation to ISIS and similar groups, than to a rational evaluation of the 
needs of security. They appear to represent an impotent expression of the frustration felt by 
Western democracies - also evident in measures such as the Strengthening Canadian 
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stripping (note 42), 16. In this respect TEOs could trace a path similar to that already traced by control orders. 
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Citizenship Act 2014 - at the prospect of allowing nationals suspected of wanting to 
participate in or facilitate the murder of other nationals on religio-political grounds to be 
received within their borders. But ironically, some of the legal expressions of that frustration 
in democracies, of which TEOs offer one example, currently appear to be at odds with the 
UN-promoted notion of a global struggle against terrorism.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
